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The ecosystem services movement was a reaction 
against nature being taken for granted in decision mak-
ing. Put a value on the services that we enjoy from eco-
systems and there is a better chance of showing their 
importance in economic and social development (Nor-
gaard 2010). Yet there are still concerns that the mon-
etization of these services is at best inappropriate and 
at worst flawed on ethical grounds and in terms of ba-
sic principles (Kapustka and McCormick 2015). Here, I 
argue that these views are missing the point about the 
need for a transparent approach to valuation.
The first argument for monetization arises directly 
from the desire to show the worth of ecosystems. Put-
ting constraints on the ways we use ecosystems in the 
economy, for raw materials and as a repository for 
wastes, by definition involves extra costs for produc-
ers and consumers alike. These are easily monetized 
and often appear as large costs for industry and soci-
ety. Stating the benefits of protecting ecosystems in 
terms of money provides a convincing way of showing 
the importance of ecosystem services in the compari-
son of these costs and benefits.
A second argument for monetization arises from the 
need to capture public preferences in a transparent 
way—this follows from a basic proposition of welfare 
(neoclassical) economics that what matters in policy 
making is finding ways to enhance the welfare (some-
times called utility) of individuals within society. There 
are other possible policy aspirations that are sometimes 
confused with this focus on the individual. One is that 
there are societal values that can sometimes override 
individual values. These are the kinds of values that 
governments are supposed to take into account when 
making policy. However, in the human health context 
for example, the obvious difference between society put-
ting a value on our lives as compared with capturing 
the value that we put on our own lives draws attention 
to the possible dangers with this kind of approach. An-
other assertion is that policies ought to take into ac-
count the intrinsic values that reside in nature. How-
ever, these values often turn out to be the values of 
those promoting the approach or are intended to make 
nature so valuable that no development would ever be 
possible.
Preferences and values are made most transpar-
ent when we trade in markets and the presumption 
from economics is that those trades will lead to a better 
state in terms of welfare. Some environmental goods 
are traded in markets such as commodities that in-
clude lumber and fish. However, most are not (they 
are so-called externalities) and the many techniques 
for capturing the way that we value these are aimed at 
making explicit our preferences transparently, in a way 
that can be used effectively in weighing the costs and 
benefits of environmental policy interventions (Han-
ley and Barbier 2009). Money is the index of utility 
and provides a common currency for the trade-off ar-
guments. Methods are developing for capturing utility 
directly, but these techniques are at an early stage and 
the results cannot easily be used in cost-benefit com-
parisons (Krueger and Stone 2014).
There are well known challenges for capturing non-
market values and using them as a better basis for en-
vironmental policy (Hanley and Barbier 2009). For ex-
ample, valuation techniques, especially those that ask 
about willingness to pay for ecosystem services, make 
the presumption that those asked know enough ecology 
to provide rational responses. This is why ecosystem 
service approaches are increasingly framed in terms 
of final outcomes (e.g., clean drinking water, ability to 
fish and swim) rather than the complex ecological prop-
erties and processes that are behind them. Alterna-
tively, when asked about hypothetical willingness to 
pay, which does not involve a hard cash transaction, 
people seem to overvalue ecological goods and services, 
and this certainly needs more research.
Kapustka and McCormick (this issue) raise even 
more fundamental concerns about the market model: 
that markets often fail to deliver because of exter-
nalities and this leads to the overexploitation of na-
ture, that we do not operate as rationally as we should 
in making decisions based on preferences, and that 
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aggregating across the people affected misses the point 
that some of these will be winners and some losers thus 
leading to increased inequality. However, the whole 
aim of the ecosystem services approach is to internal-
ize ecological externalities so that they are not forgot-
ten in policy development; this should have the effect of 
reducing not enhancing exploitation. Although behav-
ioral economics is demonstrating deviations from some 
of the core assumptions of the neoclassical model, it is 
unclear how significant these are in terms of magni-
tude and pervasiveness (Robinson and Hammitt 2011). 
Finally, on inequality the presumption is that accumu-
lating wealth is good because in principle the winners 
can compensate losers thus raising overall welfare; but, 
as noted by Piketty (2014), addressing this distribu-
tional challenge has to be a matter for governments.
Not all will want to accept a form of decision mak-
ing that is based on the preferences of the individuals 
affected, even though it is fundamentally empowering. 
There are alternative models that seek to emphasize 
the limits that nature puts on economic development 
and this includes economic ecology (Kapustka and Mc-
Cormick this issue). However, decisions still have to 
be made about what those limits mean for the econ-
omy and on balancing the inevitable tradeoffs between 
our activities and the environment. This begs the ques-
tions of who makes those decisions and how. Some 
might say let the ecologists decide, but as they move 
from the science (what is) to policy (what ought to be), 
value judgments will be exercised that need not coin-
cide with those of the public at large. Others might ar-
gue for more government, but this inevitably involves 
politics that can cloud decisions. Yet others argue for a 
more spiritual approach, but intrinsic values are elu-
sive. If the aim is to base decisions on what people want 
from ecosystems, in a way that can be weighed trans-
parently against the costs of protecting ecosystem ser-
vices, then monetization is something that should be 
embraced rather than avoided in taking the ecosystem 
services approach forward. 
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